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PROTECTING NOMINATIVE FAIR USE, PARODY,
AND OTHER SPEECH-INTERESTS BY REFORMING
THE INCONSISTENT EXEMPTIONS FROM
TRADEMARK LIABILITY
Samuel M. Duncan*
Federal trademark law exempts certain communicative uses of a trademark from
liability so that the public can freely use a trademark to comment on the markown-
er or to describe its products. These exemptions for "speech-interests" are badly
flawed because their scope is inconsistent between infringement and dilution law,
and because the cost and difficulty of claiming their protection varies significantly
from court to court. Many speech-interests remain vulnerable to the chilling threat
of litigation even though they are "protected" by current law. This Note proposes a
simple statutory reform that will remedy this inconsistency by creating an express
safe harbor for speech-interests in the Lanham Act. This reform will give full effect
to the policy behind these exemptions: that if they apply, the public ought to be able
to freely use a trademark in discourse. This reform also furthers the Lanham Act's
purpose of establishing a uniform system of nationwide trademark protection by
endorsing the simple principle that a given use of a trademark should be either
consistently protected from or vulnerable to suit in every court and under every
cause of action.
INTRODUCTION
This Note proposes a simple statutory reform to clarify the pro-
tection that the Lanham Act provides for those who use
trademarks in speech.' Under current law, the protections for
* J.D. 2009, University of Michigan Law School; B.A. 2005, Wesleyan University. Arti-
cles Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Volume 43. 1 would like to especially
thank Saloni Shah and Jacob Danziger for their editorial support, William Wall and Julia
Finkel for all their advice and encouragement, and the members of the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform editorial board for their skill and tireless work in producing this vol-
ume. I would also like to thank Professor Rebecca Eisenberg for all she did to inspire my
interest in trademark law, and for her assistance as I made progress on this Note.
1. What this Note will term "speech-interests" are a collection of several categories of
communicative or expressive uses of trademarks-for example, use in parody, nominative
uses (references to the markowner's product), noncommercial uses, and fair use. These are
exceptions to the core protection given to a markowner-the power to enjoin unauthorized
uses of the mark-in order to permit such uses to further communication and discourse.
While the specific policy justifications for the protection of each speech-interest may differ,
these differences are immaterial for the purposes of this Note; it is sufficient to note that
they are protected in some form or another by current trademark law as communicative
uses of a mark. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir.
2003) (parody); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.
1992) (nominative fair use).
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certain unlicensed communicative uses of trademarks are incon-
sistent in scope under infringement and dilution law. To
demonstrate how the current state of trademark law fails to effec-
tively protect speech-interests, this Note explores two of the most
fundamental speech-interests recognized by federal trademark law:
using a trademark to refer to the markowner's trademarked prod-
uct (nominative fair use), or to comment on or criticize the
markowner (parody). The rationale for protecting these interests is
not limited to these instances, and should apply to any similar in-
terest that outweighs the markowner's ordinary right to use the
mark exclusively. However, the need for reform is most clear in the
context of speech-interests that are already accepted as appropriate
exemptions from trademark liability.
This Note's proposed statutory reform resolves this problem and
at the same time remedies the related problem of variation in how
speech-interests are defined by different United States Circuit
Courts of Appeal, which hinders the Lanham Act's goal of estab-
lishing a uniform nationwide system of trademark protection. Most
importantly, this Note argues that the protection given to any spe-
cific speech-interest in infringement and dilution cases should be
understood by courts to be a single doctrine and should have the
same scope as a defense to each kind of claim.
This reform would ensure that socially valuable discourse could
continue free from the threat of lawsuits brought by markowners
and would further the existing policy to freely permit parody and
nominative fair use of trademarks. This Note does not, however,
address the proper level of protection that the Lanham Act should
provide for speech-interests. Instead, it presents a simple proposi-
tion: once the proper level of protection for speech-interests has
been determined,' that protection ought to be consistent across
the different types of trademark litigation. A given use of a trade-
mark, if entitled to protection, ought to be protected regardless of
the kind of claim asserted against it. This is not true under current
law,' but will be accomplished if (1) a specific, unlicensed use of a
mark consistently falls within or outside the protected category
2. As described in Part I.A, infringement law permits the owner of a trademark to en-
join the unlicensed use of similar marks that create a likelihood of confusion; dilution law
allows the owner of a famous trademark (one that is known to the general consuming pub-
lic) to enjoin the unlicensed use of marks that reduce the distinctiveness of the senior
trademark, even if the "diluting" mark is not likely to cause consumer confusion.
3. This determination is, for the purposes of this Note, simply a positive choice on
the part of Congress.
4. That is, the set of unauthorized uses of a mark for which no liability to the mar-
kowner should attach, so as to allow the mark's use in discourse.
5. See infra Parts II, III.
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across every circuit, and (2) when it is protected, that protection
should serve as a defense to both dilution and infringement claims.
I. INTRODUCTION TO TRADEMARK LAW AND THE UNJUSTIFIED
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PROTECTION GIVEN TO
SPEECH-INTERESTS IN INFRINGEMENT AND DILUTION CASES
Trademark law defines the exclusive rights given to a producer
of goods or services to use a distinctive mark to identify the origin
of those goods or services. These rights are acquired through use
of the mark in commerce, and priority of use in commerce deter-
mines which user owns the mark.' In 1946, federal trademark law
was codified in the Lanham Act.8 The Lanham Act establishes a
system for the registration of marks by their owners, and gives
markowners the ability to bring suit under two causes of action to
protect their mark against unlicensed third-party use of the mark
or similar marks.'
A. Ownership and Registration of a Trademark Entitles the
Markowner to Certain Rights
Businesses that desire to build a reputation as a merchant or
manufacturer must be able to designate certain goods and services
as their own, so that consumers can identify and distinguish their
products. This is usually accomplished through the use of a brand-
name, or a word used on the product or in its marketing. The
ability of a markowner to benefit from a trademark in this manner
would be thwarted, however, if a third party could co-opt the
trademark and in so doing, take advantage of the markowner's
6. Trademarks can include word marks, distinctive logos, or even distinctive packag-
ing or other trade dress. Although this Note focuses on word marks, its arguments should be
read to apply to any type of mark that is used communicatively, for example, a parody of a
company's logo.
7. Priority is a term of art in trademark law, defining which entity owns a given
trademark. In general, priority is acquired by being the first to use a given trademark in
commerce as an indicator of origin for goods or services. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006); Sen-
goku Works, Ltd. v. RMC Int'l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996), modified on reh'g, 97
F.3d 1460 (9th Cir. 1996) ("To acquire ownership of a trademark it is not enough to have
invented the mark first or even to have registered it first; the party claiming ownership must
have been the first to actually use the mark in the sale of goods or services."). The user of a
mark who possesses priority is the "senior user," and can assert trademark rights over "junior
users" of the mark or similar marks.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n.
9. An "unlicensed" use of a trademark is any use of the mark by an individual or enti-
ty not associated with the markowner, and without the consent of the markowner.
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good reputation, tarnish that reputation, or simply confuse con-
sumers who rely on the mark in order to identify the origin of the
product.
Trademark law establishes a limited property right in a given
mark. This grants the markowner a bundle of rights, including the
exclusive use of the trademark as a designation of origin for its
goods and services. At common law, these rights were limited to
the areae in which a markowner had acquired "priority" by being
the first to use his mark in commerce." The Lanham Act establish-
es a federal system for registering ownership of a trademark, and
gives the owner of a mark nationwide priority as of the time of reg-
istration." Federal registration is prima facie evidence of ownership
of a trademark,13 and entitles the registrant to protect his right to
exclusive use of the trademark through a suit in federal court for
infringement or, if the mark is famous, dilution."
An infringement suit protects a markowner against unlicensed
uses of its mark or similar marks where a "likelihood of confusion"
exists as to whether the infringing goods or services are in fact
those of the markowner 5 An infringement action, in other words,
10. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916).
11. Great Basin Brewing Co. v. Healdsburg Brewing Co., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1751,
1753 (D. Nev. 1997) ("Ownership of a trademark is established by use of the mark, not by
federal registration thereof.").
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1051. It should be noted that the Lanham Act defines a system of regis-
tration of already-acquired marks, rather than a system of acquiring ownership. See Allard
Enters. v. Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 146 F.3d 350, 356 (6th Cir. 1998) ("One of the
bedrock principles of trademark law is that trademark or 'service mark ownership is not
acquired by federal or state registration. Rather, ownership rights flow only from prior ap-
propriation and actual use in the market.'") (quoting Homeowners Grp., Inc. v. Home
Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1105 (6th Cir. 1991)).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1115. Registration of a trademark is deemed to be prima facie evidence
that the registrant owns the mark, and is thus entitled to exclusive use of the mark in com-
merce throughout the United States. Id. The scope of exclusivity is no longer limited to the
area in which the owner has used the mark in commerce. Id.
14. See id. §§ 1114, 1125. A famous mark is one that is "widely recognized by the gen-
eral consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or
services of the mark's owner." Id. § 1125(c) (2).
15. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
Polaroid sets out the modem, multifactor test for trademark infringement, usually called
"traditional likelihood of confusion" analysis. This test examines eight factors, which are:
[Tihe strength of [the prior owner's] mark, the degree of similarity between the two
marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge
the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its
own mark, the quality of defendant's product, and the sophistication of the buyers.
Id. While each court of appeals employs its own test for likelihood of confusion, most are at
least inspired by Polaroid. See, e.g., Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th
Cir. 1984); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983); AMF, Inc. v.
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protects the markowner from competitors who aim to profit from
the markowner's reputation by convincing consumers that the in-
fringer's goods are those of the markowner.16 Hence, there must be
actual or potential economic competition between the markowner
and the allegedly infringing junior user.17
Dilution protects an entirely distinct interest-protecting a mar-
kowner from unlicensed use of the mark by a non-competitor that
weakens or devalues the mark. Such devaluation can take place in
two ways: dilution by "blurring," where the dilutive use makes the
markowner's mark less distinctive, and thereby lessens its power as
a designator of origin," and dilution by "tarnishment," where the
dilutive use leads to a tawdry or unpleasant association with the
mark.'9 While infringement claims turn on the likelihood of
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church
& Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1331 (7th Cir. 1977).
16. However, infringement claims can also be brought on a theory of "reverse confu-
sion," where consumers are led to believe that the markowner's goods are in fact those of
the infringer. See, e.g., Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.
1988) ("Reverse confusion is the misimpression that the junior user is the source of the
senior user's goods.... [C]onsumers may consider [the senior user] the unauthorized in-
fringer, and [the junior user's] use of the mark may in that way injure [the senior user's]
reputation and impair its good will.").
17. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 E3d 1036,
1055-56 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that when goods are strongly related, infringement can
exist even when most other factors favor defendant; when there is little or no relation be-
tween goods, confusion is unlikely); see also Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495-96 (discussing that the
limited degree of competition in the case was enough to establish liability).
18. Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002). This loss of distinctiveness
can result simply from the addition to the market of a second business using the same mark.
Id. (describing dilution by blurring as the "concern that consumer search costs will rise if a
trademark becomes associated with a variety of unrelated products"). Judge Posner goes on
to provide an example:
Suppose an upscale restaurant calls itself "Tiffany." There is little danger that the
consuming public will think it's dealing with a branch of the Tiffany jewelry store if it
patronizes this restaurant. But when consumers next see the name "Tiffany" they may
think about both the restaurant and the jewelry store, and if so the efficacy of the
name as an identifier of the store will be diminished. Consumers will have to think
harder-incur as it were a higher imagination cost-to recognize the name as the
name of the store.
Id.
19. Id.Judge Posner provides a related example of dilution by tarnishment:
Now suppose that the "restaurant" that adopts the name "Tiffany" is actually a strip-
tease joint. Again, and indeed even more certainly than in the previous case,
consumers will not think the striptease joint under common ownership with the
jewelry store. But because of the inveterate tendency of the human mind to proceed
by association, every time they think of the word "Tiffany" their image of the fancy
jewelry store will be tarnished by the association of the word with the strip joint.
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consumer confusion, which can arise from the use of a similar un-
licensed mark, dilution claims assert that the unlicensed use
fundamentally changes how consumers understand the markown-
er's mark. Hence, the alleged dilutor must use a mark that is nearly
identical to that of the markowner, or at least one that is more sim-
ilar than would be sufficient to support an infringement claim.20
Further, the right to sue for dilution under the Lanham Act is only
provided to the owners of famous marks.2 ' Because of these two
limitations, there are far fewer instances in which a markowner is
entitled to protection against dilution. This counterbalances the
far broader reach of dilution claims, which, unlike infringement
claims, can prohibit unlicensed uses that are unrelated to the mar-
21kowner's line of business.
B. "Speech-Interests" and Trademark Law
Trademark law can give a markowner a property right in a word.
This can be troubling if, as in many cases, that word is not arbitrary
and fanciful, but is suggestive or descriptive, such that the word
is used in other contexts. Further, many trademarks have become
part of the English language in common usage today.26 Most im-
Id.
20. Perfumebay.com, Inc. v. eBay, Inc. 506 F.3d 1165, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007) ("The mark
used by the alleged diluter must be identical, or nearly identical, to the protected mark for a
dilution claim to succeed.") (quoting Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d
1002, 1011 (9th Cir. 2004)). But see Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 588
F.3d 97, 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that similarity is a factor to be considered in dilution
cases, but rejecting any bright-line test). The leading treatise on trademark law contends
that the marks must be identical, or at the very least, that it is nigh-impossible to prove dilu-
tion by a similar but not identical mark, because the harm caused by dilution results from
consumers identifying one mark with two sources, those of the senior user and of the al-
leged dilutor. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24:117 (4th ed. 2010). However, even if Professor McCarthy's view does not
prevail, this Note's contentions are unaffected, since the broader scope of a markowner's
rights under dilution law makes it more, rather than less important that the intended excep-
tions to trademark protection work to effectively protect speech-interests.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2) (2006); see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
22. Whereas all markowners may, by definition, bring a claim for infringement against
any unlicensed use of a similar mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
23. See id. § 1125(c)(1) ("[The senior user may enjoin the] use of a mark or trade
name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of
the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or
of actual economic injury." (emphasis added)).
24. For example, "Kodak" is a word created specifically for use as a brand name.
25. Generic terms cannot be trademarked, and any registration of a trademarked term
that is or has become generic can be cancelled. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).
26. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 397 (1990).
FALL 2010] Protecting Nominative Fair Use 225
portantly, however, there are some instances in which a trade-
marked term is almost essential to communication, such as when
referring to the markowner's product when there is no satisfactory
substitute for the trademarked term." Trademark law has devel-
oped exceptions from the markowner's right to exclude in order to
allow others to freely use a trademark in speech, including "fair
use" of a trademark, "nominative" fair use of a trademark to refer
to the markowner's product,2" or in traditional forms of protected
speech, such as parody.29 These doctrines, taken together, can be
termed "speech-interests": exceptions that protect the ability of in-
dividuals to freely use a trademark in discourse, or to express
certain ideas or concepts.so
The problem, elaborated further in Part II and Part III, is that
the protection given to these speech-interests is inconsistent. The
Circuit Courts of Appeal employ several different tests for, and def-
initions of, speech-interests, leaving no uniform, nationwide
standard for how speech-interests are to be protected. This means
that a given use of a trademark can be held to be protected speech
27. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2002). For a discus-
sion of this case, see infra Part II.
28. Nominative fair use is the unlicensed use of a trademark to refer to the trademarked
product, such as a music store or fan club using a trademarked band name to identify the
band's own products. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308
(9th Cir. 1992).
29. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). Cf
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the First
Amendment did not protect a parodist from liability for infringement when the parody
created a likelihood of confusion that was not outweighed by the public interest in protect-
ing the parodist's expression, because the use of the mark in a way likely to confuse was not
necessary to the parody). Some scholars argue that parody should receive broad First
Amendment protection. See Aaron F. Jaroff, Comment, Big Boi, Barbie, Dr. Seuss, and The
King: Expanding the Constitutional Protections for the Satirical Use of Famous Trademarks, 57 Am.
U.L. REv. 641, 680-81. Since a trademark is a property right held by an individual, however,
there is a strong argument that the First Amendment does not override this individual right
any more than it requires any other property owner to allow another to use his property to
speak. See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) ("We
believe, however, that the protection afforded by the First Amendment does not give [the
defendant] license to infringe the rights of [the plaintiff].... [The plaintiffs] trademarks
are a form of property."). The public interest in free expression and in open discourse is,
however, properly considered by a court when deciding trademark cases. See, e.g., Rogers v.
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 944, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Though First Amendment concerns do not
insulate titles of artistic works from all Lanham Act claims, such concerns must nonetheless
inform our consideration of the scope of the Act as applied to claims involving such titles.").
Further, the First Amendment provides more protection for parodists (and others) when
trademarked terms are used to signal something other than the identity of the source of a
product. See, e.g., Matte4 353 F.3d at 807.
30. Discourse, in this sense, includes some expressive commercial speech such as
comparative advertising (often an example of nominative fair use), or a product or good
that functions as a parody of a well-known product or good.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
in one circuit and infringing in another." More importantly, there
are differences between the types of use that are considered to be
protected speech-interests under dilution and infringement law,
such that a given unlicensed use of a mark can be simultaneously
protected from a trademark dilution claim as a speech-interest,
and subject to a claim for infringement in the very same case.33 Fi-
nally, even if the same unlicensed use of a mark is protected as a
speech-interest in both infringement and dilution cases, there are
differences in how that protection is asserted that make it much less
expensive, more straightforward, and generally more possible for
an individual to successfully defend his use of a trademark as a
speech-interest in a dilution case than in an infringement case.
This inconsistency undermines the essential purpose of protect-
ing certain uses of a trademark as speech-interests. If the purpose
of establishing these exceptions is to ensure that marks can be used
communicatively without the markowner's consent,34 then incon-
sistent protection frustrates that purpose. A junior user cannot
comfortably use a trademark if only one kind of claim is barred to
protect speech-interests because the junior user remains open to
suit from the senior user for the unprotected claim. The risk may
be somewhat reduced, but a mere reduction in risk does not obvi-
ate the chilling threat of litigation, a threat that is inconsistent with
a policy to permit communicative uses of trademarked terms by
junior users.
31. This is partially the result of a system in which the various courts of appeal do not
bind one another. That particular inconsistency is not the focus of this Note, but will be in
part remedied as an ancillary benefit of the proposed reform. The other reason for this
problem, however, is that some speech-interests, such as nominative fair use, are judicially
defined, and so there is no common source of the protection given to a speech-interest that
is later interpreted byjudges (which, in turn, entails some additional variation in standards).
32. For example, a parody on a T-shirt that uses the mark.
33. See Toni & Guy (USA), Ltd. v. Nature's Therapy, Inc., No. 03-CV-2420 (RMB), 2006
WL 1153354, at *4, *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2006).
34. 4 McCARTHY, supra note 20, § 24:126 ("The parody safe harbor [in dilution law] is
obviously intended to accommodate the interests of using famous marks in free speech and
expression."). Further, the fact that the statutory protection for parody applies to parodies
that are not used as trademarks in their own right demonstrates the intent to narrow the
protection for parody to communicative or expressive uses. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)
(2006); Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 266 (4th Cir.
2060).
226 [VOL. 44:1
Protecting Nominative Fair Use
II. COURTs DIFFER IN THEIR INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EXCEPTION
FOR NOMINATIVE FAIR USE, LEADING TO INCONSISTENT
PROTECTION OF TRADEMARK RIGHTS
Under the law of trademark infringement, nominative fair use is
a judicially created exception to a markowner's exclusive rights
that protects from liability the unlicensed use of a trademark that
describes or refers to the senior user's goods or services.35 While
nominative fair use is conceptually the same when employed as a
defense under either dilution or infringement claims, under dilu-
tion law the defense is statutory, established by the Trademark
Dilution Reform Act of 2005 (TDRA) . This alone gives rise to a
certain degree of inconsistency, and in light of Congress's intent to
protect the ability to use trademarked terms in speech, it makes
little sense to define nominative fair use in one way for infringe-
ment claims and in a different way for dilution claims, when using
a protected speech-interest could expose the user to a lawsuit un-
der each type of claim.
If terms and concepts that are common or essential in modem
discourse are registered trademarks, it is important to allow their
use in speech, free of the risk of a lawsuit for trademark infringe-
ment or dilution. In the case of nominative fair use, this necessity
has been best described by the Ninth Circuit:
[T]here is no other way that [the defendant] can identify or
describe herself and her services [without using the trade-
marked terms "Playmate" or "Playmate of the Year"] without
venturing into absurd descriptive phrases. To describe herself
as the "nude model selected by Mr. Hefner's magazine as its
number-one prototypical woman for the year 1981" would be
35. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.
1992) (establishing the doctrine of nominative fair use); see also 4 MCCARTIiY, Supra note 20,
§ 23:11 (describing the origin of the nominative fair use doctrine). A claim of nominative
fair use is properly thought of as a use of a trademarked term that is not likely to cause con-
fusion when viewed properly, whereas a "classic" fair use is one that is likely to confuse
consumers, but should be nonetheless permitted for equitable reasons. Id.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (3). The TDRA added one set of statutory defenses (parody,
nominative fair use) to two already-existing categories, with the explicit goal of clarifying
those defenses. H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 4-6 (2005), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.CAN. 1091,
1092-95; see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 24:123. The TDRA clearly provides that these
new statutory defenses apply in dilution cases only. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).
37. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 24:123; Dreyfuss, supra note 26, at 397-98.
38. See Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2002) (justifying an excep-
tion for defendant's nominative fair use of the plaintiffs mark because "[n]o descriptive
substitute exists for [the plaintiffs] trademarks in this context").
227FALL 2010]1
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
impractical as well as ineffectual in identifying Terri Welles to
the public."
Protection for those using trademarks in speech against a claim of
dilution is of little value absent similar protection against a claim of
infringement, especially because as compared to infringement
claims, dilution cases are rare (appearing in only one out of four
reported trademark cases) and are less likely to succeed.40 Once
Congress has determined the circumstances in which individuals
ought to be permitted to use trademarked terms freely, failing to
protect such uses from claims of both dilution and infringement
would subvert the goal of allowing trademarks to be used in com-
municative or expressive speech, as such use would still be chilled
by the threat of an infringement suit.
Even though the TDRA is relatively recent,2 the problem of a
trademark user being entitled to protection from dilution claims,
but having to defend an infringement claim based on the same use
is not merely theoretical. Instead, there is at least one case where
the markowner's dilution claim was summarily rejected based on
the statutory protection for fair use, but its infringement claim was
entitled to full judicial review, even though both claims were based
on the same unlicensed use of the mark. This case makes the risk
of inconsistency plain to see. A statutory defense of fair use, as is
available for dilution claims, is relatively straightforward to litigate.
Without a statutory defense, a claim of trademark infringement
involves a multifactor, fact-based analysis4 requiring significantly
39. Id. (quoting Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1079 (S.D. Cal. 1999)).
40. See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 585, 625-27, 631 (2008). Further, a dilution claim requires a showing that the senior
user's mark is famous; hence, a dilution claim is not available for all trademarks (whereas, to
make a broad generalization, the opposite is true for a claim of infringement). See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1114,1125.
41. Jesse A. Hofrichter, Note, Tool of the Trademark: Brand Criticism and Free Speech Prob-
lems with the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923, 1952-54
(2007) (discussing the risk of chilling effects caused by trademark claims that will survive
absent an effective shield for protected speech).
42. The TDRA was enacted in 2006. Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006).
43. Toni & Guy (USA), Ltd. v. Nature's Therapy, Inc., No. 03-CV-2420 (RMB), 2006
WL 1153354, at *4, *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2006) (holding that the use of a trademark in
comparative advertising was protected from dilution claims as fair use, but was subject to
review for potential infringement under the Polaroid test). The court in Toni & Guy eventu-
ally concluded that the use was non-infringing. Id. at *12. See also Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay,
Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 496-98, 502-08, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (analyzing the infringe-
ment claim as nominative fair use based on court-created doctrines, but summarily rejecting
the dilution claim due to statutory exemption).
44. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); see also 4
MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 24:60 (commenting on the Second Circuit test set out in Polar-
oid and historical variations in its application).
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more time, effort, and money to litigate.4 5 The very risk of having
to extensively litigate a case can be enough on its own to discour-
age the unlicensed use of trademarks in speech, even if such use
will ultimately be held non-infringing at trial. Extending the statu-
tory protection for speech-interests to include infringement claims
would prevent such dangerous chilling effects.
This chilling effect was one of the principal problems that the
TDRA was enacted to prevent." By clarifying the scope of the pro-
tection from dilution, Congress intended to help not only
speakers, but also markowners, know with more certainty when
they could and could not successfully assert their rights. 7 The rea-
sons why Congress reformed these exemptions to dilution law, and
enumerated defenses explicitly in the TDRA, are equally applicable
as to infringement law. Further, any substantial threat of litigation
is inconsistent with the purpose of creating exemptions that pro-
tect speech-interests from liability under the Lanham Act. If these
protections are to be meaningful, they have to be effective. In or-
der to be effective, they have to be available to parties who may not
have the resources or the resolve to pursue major federal litigation
in order to assert their right to use a trademark in speech. As will
be demonstrated in Part IV, synchronizing the protection given to
speech-interests such as nominative fair use will resolve inconsist-
encies and will further the current policy of permitting such uses.
While this Note does not propose the precise level of protection
that Congress should establish, the TDRA itself may be assumed to
45. SeeJulie Manning Magid, Anthony D. Cox & Dena S. Cox, Quantifying Brand Image:
Empirical Evidence Of Trademark Dilution, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 24-25 (2006) (discussing the
expense and difficulty of acquiring survey information about consumer understandings of
trademarks). Survey information is often necessary to prove elements of the multifactor test
for likelihood of confusion, such as the similarity of the two marks, or actual confusion. See,
e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[A] usual
way to demonstrate either consumer confusion or secondary meaning, in a case where the
existence of secondary meaning or consumer confusion is not otherwise obvious, is for the
proponent to undertake some form of survey of consumer attitudes under actual market
conditions.").
46. H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 6 (2005), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1091, 1094
("[T]hird parties have little guidance regarding what marks they can safely adopt without
risk of dilution liability. The lack of clarity in the law and the splits in the various circuits are
resulting in forum shopping and unnecessarily costly lawsuits." (quoting Hearings on the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual
Property, Comm. on the judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Anne Gundelfinger on
behalf of the International Trademark Association))). Despite its brevity, the House report
specifically discusses the TDRA's goal of clarifying and simplifying when a trademark is enti-
tled to protection, specifically focusing on the chilling effect and unnecessary cost of
litigation. Id. at 4-6.
47. Id.
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represent Congress's current estimation of the appropriate level of
protection for speech-interests under trademark law.
A further problem with leaving the protection of fair use in the
hands of the judiciary is that the standards for nominative fair use
vary between the circuit courts of appeal. 8 Such variation is incon-
sistent with a system of nationwide trademark protection, 9 under
which the uses of a mark that a markowner can enjoin, and the
scope of protection given to speech-interests, ought to be the same
across the nation.50 This problem is more acute where the doctrine
in question is judicially created, because there is no relevant rule
within the statutory framework to structure judicial decision-
making. The most significant difference in judicial interpretations
of nominative fair use is that between the Ninth Circuit and the
Third Circuit.' Most other circuit courts apply traditional likeli-
hood of confusion analysis,52 but the Third and Ninth Circuit each
employ their own test to review claims of nominative fair use.
In the Ninth Circuit, the standard multifactor test for likelihood
of confusion is not used when the "defense" of nominative fair use
is raised; instead, a replacement three-factor test is applied. " The
48. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th
Cir. 1992) (establishing a three-factor test); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree,
Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 228 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's test in favor of an alter-
native three-factor test); Univ. of Fla. v. KPB, Inc., 89 F.3d 773, 777 (11th Cir. 1996)
(applying the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis); see also 4 McCARTHY, supra note
20, § 23:11 (discussing the various tests for nominative fair use). As already noted, such vari-
ation was one justification for the TDRA. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
49. See S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 178 & n.12 (2d Cir. 1949)
("[I]t is no longer open to doubt that the present act created rights uniform throughout the
Union."); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 5:4 (discussing the legislative history of the Lanham
Act); cf Baila H. Celedonia & Kieran Doyle, Statutory and Nominative Fair Use under the Lan-
ham Act, in ADVANCED SEMINAR ON TRADEMARK LAW 103, 110-13, 127 (2007) (discussing
the inconsistency of fair use protection across circuits, but also contending that such incon-
sistency is created by an effort to fairly balance the interests of markowners and speakers).
50. A similar problem that divided the courts of appeal was recently resolved by the
Supreme Court's decision that a defense of "classic" fair use can survive a finding that confu-
sion is likely between the markowner's use of the mark and the allegedly infringing use. See
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 125 (2004) (hold-
ing that a defense of fair use does not require a finding that no confusion is likely). The
Court's holding supports this Note's contention that there are substantial benefits to a uni-
form standard for the exceptions to a markowner's rights; such a standard is almost
necessary to achieve the Lanham Act's goal of a nationwide system of trademark protection.
51. See supra note 48.
52. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 20, § 23:11. (collecting cases and noting that the re-
sults of the Ninth Circuit's test are broadly consistent to those courts of appeal which
evaluate nominative fair use using traditional likelihood of confusion analysis). Traditional
likelihood of confusion analysis is reported to obtain results similar to that of the Ninth
Circuit's three-factor test. See KPPermanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 125.
53. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 24:60; Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801
(9th Cir. 2002) ("In cases in which the defendant raises a nominative use defense, the above
three-factor test should be applied instead of the test for likelihood of confusion set forth in
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Ninth Circuit's test was rejected by the Third Circuit in Century 21
Real Estate v. Lendingtree," which chose to apply a modified version
of the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis that emphasized
four factors.
A. The Ninth Circuit's Test for Nominative Fair Use
The Ninth Circuit's test for nominative fair use has three ele-
ments:
First, the product or service in question must be one not read-
ily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so
much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably nec-
essary to identify the product or service; and third, the user
must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark,
suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark hold-
56
er.
In effect, this test's first element requires that the use of the senior
user's mark is essential for communicative purposes, the second
element requires that the junior user uses the mark only to the ex-
tent that is necessary, and the third element requires that the use is
solely nominative. The Ninth Circuit has provided more than one
rationale for using an alternative to the traditional likelihood of
confusion test. Originally, it held that nominative fair use did not
cause consumer confusion and was hence "outside the strictures of
trademark law."57 Recently, however, the justification that has more
often been emphasized is that the traditional analysis is likely to be
less accurate than the alternative test in the context of nominative
f*58fair use.
Sleekcraft. The three-factor test better evaluates the likelihood of confusion in nominative use
cases.") (citing AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979)); see also
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
54. 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005).
55. Id. at 221. The dissent in Century 21 would follow the majority of circuits in reject-
ing a specialized test for nominative fair use in favor of the simple application of the
traditional test for likelihood of confusion analysis. Id. at 233 (Fisher,J., dissenting).
56. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992)
(footnote omitted); see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002).
57. See New Kids on the Block 971 F.2d at 308.
58. See Playboy Enters., 279 F.3d at 801; see also Century 21, 425 F.3d at 220 & n.1 (discuss-
ing the Ninth Circuit's shift). These justifications are not irreconcilable. If one accepts the
premise that nominative fair use, when understood properly, cannot create a likelihood of
confusion, then the Ninth Circuit is correct that it is beyond the realm of trademark protec-
tion. If the test is better understood as attempting to determine whether or not a given use is
nominative, then it is also true that the New Kids on the Block test is more accurate than the
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The Ninth Circuit occasionally describes nominative fair use as
an affirmative defense,5 9 a position that is unlikely to survive be-
cause it is almost impossible to reconcile with the Supreme Court's
holding in the context of traditional fair use that the plaintiff must
continue to bear the burden of showing that a junior user's use of
its mark is likely to cause confusion even when the junior user
claims that its usage is protected as fair use."o This principle is espe-
cially relevant for nominative fair use, where a senior user's mark is
used to refer to the senior user's product.6 ' Because nominative fair
use does not involve the use of the senior user's mark to designate
the origin of the junior user's product," it is very unlikely to con-
fuse a consumer into believing that the senior user is the maker of
the junior user's product."
The Ninth Circuit's test for nominative fair use does not apply
the same type of analysis used in the traditional likelihood of con-
fusion test, but as Professor McCarthy notes, its results are broadly
consistent with those from courts of appeal that apply the tradi-
tional multifactor test in nominative fair use cases. Even so, the
distinctions between the two are important. The Ninth Circuit's
test does not require analysis of consumer understandings of the
traditional likelihood of confusion analysis. See 4 MCCARTHY, supr note 20, § 23:11 (noting
that the Ninth Circuit's test seems to be at least as accurate as the traditional likelihood of
confusion test at reaching the "correct" result in cases of nominative fair use). Hence, these
two rationales are complementary. If a finding of nominative fair use entitles the user to be
exempt from liability (the first rationale), there are good reasons to determine if a given use
is nominative fair use as efficiently and accurately as possible. Without the first rationale,
there is no reason to require a specialized test that only determines whether or not a given
use is nominative fair use.
59. See, e.g., Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 907-09 & n.5 (9th Cir.
2003) (discussing the nominative fair use standard and citing Professor McCarthy's analysis
thereof, while holding that the defendant bears the burden of proof to show that his use is
not likely to cause confusion when claiming nominative fair use).
60. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 125
(2004); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 23:11. Although the two doctrines are conceptually
different, Professor McCarthy is correct that KP Permanent Make-Up almost certainly foreclos-
es treating a claim of nominative fair use as an affirmative defense in which the defendant
bears the burden of showing that his use of the senior user's mark is not likely to confuse.
61. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 20, § 23:11; New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 & n.7
(explaining the definition of nominative fair use and the limited scope of uses protected
under that doctrine).
62. Instead, the use of the senior user's mark is, by definition, a communicative refer-
ence to the senior user's product.
63. See Playboy Enters., 279 F.3d at 801 ("Thus, application of the Sleekcraft [likelihood of
confusion] test, which focuses on the similarity of the mark used by the plaintiff and the
defendant, would lead to the incorrect conclusion that virtually all nominative uses are con-
fusing." (emphasis added)).
64. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 23:11. This suggests that a statutory reform
which simplifies nominative fair use analysis will not alter the underlying substantive law of
"likelihood of confusion" from which the nominative fair use "defense" is derived.
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two marks to the same degree that the traditional likelihood of
confusion test demands.6 ' Hence, the Ninth Circuit's test is simpler
to apply, requires less extensive fact-finding to decide, and is likely
to be more accurate in reaching the proper result in cases involv-
ing nominative fair use of trademarks.
B. The Third Circuit's Test for Nominative Fair Use
The Third Circuit has recently rejected using either of the estab-
lished tests for nominative fair use in trademark infringement
cases: the Ninth Circuit's specialized test and the standard likeli-
hood of confusion analysis used by many other courts. Instead,
the Third Circuit established a bifurcated test, in which the plain-
tiff first must prove the likelihood of consumer confusion through
a four-factor test, and then the defendant must show that the use,
although found to be confusing, is in fact "fair."6 The four-factor
test was created by identifying and isolating those elements of its
ten-factor test for likelihood of confusion that the court considers
to be relevant in evaluating a raised defense of nominative fair
use.6 9 Specifically, the court looks to:
(1) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the
care and attention expected of consumers when making a
purchase;(2) the length of time the defendant has used the
mark without evidence of actual confusion; (3) the intent of
the defendant in adopting the mark; and (4) the evidence of
actual confusion.o
The Third Circuit's justification for its focus on these four factors is
that "they analyze the likelihood that a consumer will be confused
as to the relationship or affiliation between [the senior and junior
65. See Century 21 Real Estate, Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005);
New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308; see also supra note 48. Traditional likelihood of confu-
sion analysis seeks to determine whether consumers will understand the marks as (correctly)
designating different sources, or whether the junior user's use of the mark creates confu-
sion, and thus, this test always requires substantial analysis of how the marks are perceived by
consumers.
66. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., 279 F.3d at 801-02; see also 4 McCARTHY, sup-a note 20.
67. Century 21, 425 F.3d at 221.
68. Id. at 222-23.
69. Id. at 221, 225 (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225,
1229 (3d Cir. 1978)).
70. Id. at 225-26 (quoting Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 781 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir.
1983)).
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users], the heart of the nominative fair use situation."" As previous-
ly noted, the absence of such confusion is a premise of the Ninth
Circuit's analysis. 72
The Third Circuit's bifurcated analysis for nominative fair use
significantly diverges from that of other courts.7 ' Bifurcation is
commonly used to decide "classic" fair use cases, where the court
determines if a junior user is entitled to use a mark in certain ways
after the initial determination that such use is likely to confuse.
Nominative fair use, as explained above, does not cause consumer
confusion at all, and so it is not necessary to determine the likeli-
hood of confusion as the threshold issue of a bifurcated test.7 5
The Third Circuit rejects the application of its full test for likeli-
hood of confusion in order to specifically allow for the existence of
a "fair use" that is likely to confuse, but ought not to be held to in-
fringe the senior user's mark. In his dissent in Century 21, Judge
Fisher persuasively argues that the majority made the same error
that it accused the Ninth Circuit of: treating nominative fair use as
an affirmative defense to a claim of infringement (and thus shift-
ing the burden of proof to the defendant), rather than as a
situation in which no likelihood of confusion should exist.7 7
The justifications offered by the Third Circuit for rejecting like-
lihood of confusion analysis in cases of nominative fair use are also
reasons to use a specialized test such as that applied by the Ninth
Circuit.78 The Third Circuit agreed, and was "tempted" to endorse
the Ninth Circuit's test itself, but instead, "conclude [d] that the
test as written suffers from a lack of clarity" as shown by the "con-
tortions" the Ninth Circuit found necessary to make the test
71. Id. at 226.
72. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801-02 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting
that the role of a specialized test for nominative fair use is to determine if the use is in fact
nominative, and rejecting the application of a traditional likelihood of confusion test as
prone to producing false positives, since nominative use is not likely to cause confusion).
73. See id.; 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 23:11.
74. SeeKP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118-22
(2004).
75. See Playboy Enters., 279 F.3d at 801-02; 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 23:11. But see
Century 21, 425 F.3d at 225-26 (noting that likelihood of confusion factors were not relevant
in the instant case, but could be helpful in future cases analyzing nominative fair use).
76. Century 21, 425 F.3d at 222 (citing KPPermanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 121). But see
id. at 232-33, 238 (Fisher,J., dissenting) (contending that, in contrast to the majority, nom-
inative fair use should be seen simply as a question of no likely confusion, rather than as a
defense to infringement).
77. Id. at 237-38.
78. Id. at 222 (majority opinion).
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functional, and hence modified the Ninth Circuit's test to create its
own test for nominative fair use. 9
The principal issue that the Third Circuit sought to address with
its test for nominative fair use, outside the scope of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's test, is the aforementioned situation in which a use is found
to be likely to confuse but still protected as nominative fair use."'
This change is not a mere modification of the Ninth Circuit's anal-
ysis, but an outright rejection of the principle behind the Ninth
Circuit's test. At its base, the Ninth Circuit considers nominative
fair use to be unlikely to cause confusion because the junior user's
use of the trademark unambiguously refers to the senior user's
product. Hence a reasonable consumer would not believe that the
junior user's use of the mark suggested or implied that the senior
user was actually the source of the junior user's goods."' The major-
ity of the case law in other circuit courts is consistent with the
Ninth Circuit's definition of nominative fair use, although the
courts outside the Third Circuit and Ninth Circuit arrive at these
similar results by applying the traditional likelihood of confusion
test."
C. Conclusions
While each of the Ninth Circuit, Third Circuit, and traditional
likelihood of confusion tests appears to be sensible and effective at
identifying nominative fair use, there is little to justify the use of
three conceptually different tests in a system based on nationwide
protection for trademarks.2 A system of nationwide protection is
best served by a consistent process for determining whether a jun-
ior user's use of a trademark is protected as nominative fair use.
The most immediate problem for a potential party in a trademark
79. Id. at 228. As explained below, The Third Circuit's analysis is more than a mere
"modification" of the Ninth Circuit's test: it is based on a fundamentally different premise.
80. Id. at 222 (citing KPPermanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 121). But see id. at 232-33, 238
(FisherJ., dissenting).
81. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 & n.7 (9th Cir.
1992); see also Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Thus, applica-
tion of the Sleekcraft test, which focuses on the similarity of the mark used by the plaintiff and
the defendant, would lead to the incorrect conclusion that virtually all nominative uses are
confusing.").
82. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 23:11 (collecting cases and evaluating out-
comes). The traditional likelihood of confusion test simply does not provide for a situation
in which a use is confusing, but permitted: the gravamen of the analysis is simply whether or
not confusion is likely.
83. See supra note 49; S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 178 & n.12
(2d Cir. 1949).
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lawsuit is that the three tests seem on their face to be of varying
complexity, and likely to cause differences among circuits in the
costs and difficulties that a junior user faces in defending a trade-
mark infringement claim on the principle of nominative fair use. A
statutory provision establishing a singular doctrine for nominative
fair use would help to resolve such issues and uncertainties.
Further, if courts adopt the Ninth Circuit's definition of nomina-
tive fair use, then they should also adopt its conclusion that
specialized and simplified analysis is appropriate, as the principal
question to be resolved is whether or not the use is, in fact, nomi-
native. A specialized test is beneficial because it is simpler and less
expensive to utilize, which minimizes the risk of chilling speech in
cases where the use of a trademark is permitted as nominative fair
use, but where the speaker does not have the resources or the re-
solve to pursue complex federal litigation to assert that right.
III. COURTS DIFFER IN THEIR INTERPRETATIONS OF PARODY,
LEADING TO INCONSISTENT PROTECTION OF TRADEMARK RIGHTS
AND THREATENING THE CONSISTENT NATIONWIDE
PROTECTION OF TRADEMARKS
One of the basic premises of this Note's argument is that if fed-
eral trademark law is to grant consistent nationwide protection, as
the Lanham Act intends, a given unlicensed use of a mark must be
consistently protected or unprotected as a speech-interest in every
circuit, and in every type of trademark claim. This is, in part, simp-
ly a definitional argument: once trademark law has established an
exemption to permit a specific unlicensed use of a mark as a
speech-interest,5 that use is effectively permitted only if the exemp-
tion is uniformly defined in every type of claim, and the system of
trademark protection is nationwide only if that definition is uni-
formly applied in every federal court. In other words, the Lanham
Act provides consistent nationwide protection to registered marks
only when its grant of rights to markowners, and the exceptions there-
to, are consistently defined and applied. Further, this premise
84. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 & n.7; see also Audi AG v. Shokan Coachworks,
Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 246, 269-70 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (analyzing district court cases from within
the Second Circuit and concluding that when those courts discussed a nominative fair use
defense, they uniformly applied the New Kids on the Block framework); Liquid Glass Enters.,
Inc. v. Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG, 8 F. Supp. 2d 398, 402 (D.N.J. 1998) (applying New Kids on
the Block); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 23:11 (concluding that this definition is both the
most widely accepted and the most correct from a scholarly viewpoint).
85. Again, the positivist determination of which speech-interests ought to outweigh the
property rights of a markowner is not an issue that this Note attempts to answer.
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embodies the concept that the difficult policy determination is
which third-party uses of a trademark should not be actionable.
Once that determination is made, it is an effective policy only when
trademark law consistently either permits or precludes liability for
a specific use in every suit and every court. Finally, this principle is
fundamental to the concept of a speech-interest. The rationale be-
hind protecting the unlicensed use of trademarks for speech-
interests is that there is social value in allowing the communicative
use of trademarks." The very purpose of the exemption is to allow
the use of the mark, and this purpose is frustrated unless the ex-
emption is legally structured to effectively permit such use.
Parody is the use of a trademark to comment on or criticize the
markowner.7 This creates an inherent conflict between the policy
of protecting the rights of the markowner and the right of free ex-
pression and the interests of the individual parodying the
markowner. As the Second Circuit has stated, "the keystone of par-
ody is imitation.... A parody must convey two simultaneous-and
contradictory-messages: that it is the original, but also that it is
not the original and is instead a parody."8 This conflict shows how
delicate a balance exists between the right of the markowner to
assert his property right and the right of the parodist to comment
on the markowner. Because these rights are in direct conflict, a
lack of clarity injures both the parodist and markowner, and thus,
consistent statutory protection for parody is essential for either
party to understand and enforce its rights. Once the uses of a
trademark that should be protected as parodies have been enu-
merated, they should be protected. That is the purpose of this
Note's proposal: to establish an effective and consistently applied
statutory exemption from trademark liability for parody.
Parody is another useful example of a speech-interest in need of
reform, and is particularly relevant since courts have clearly
acknowledged that certain types of parody are clearly established as
worthy of protection as a speech-interest, as the purpose of the ex-
emption for parody is to empower individuals to use trademarks
86. See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 26, at 418-19; 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 20,
§ 24:126.
87. In the context of trademark law a "parody" is generally entitled to protection as a
speech-interest only when the parody is targeted at or relates to the markowner. See, e.g.,
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901-02 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
public's interest in permitting a parodist's expressive use of Mattel's "Barbie" trademark was
stronger, and entitled to more weight, when the parody was commenting on the original
mark or the markowner); Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813-14 (2d Cir.
1999).
88. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494
(2d Cir. 1989).
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without the consent of the markowner." Hence, it is odd that it is
protected inconsistently, and that as a result, a parodist is uncertain
as to whether or not he will be liable for trademark infringement,
even in instances where he is immune from claims of trademark
dilution.
A. The Theory of Why Parody Is Not Actionable Is Inconsistent
as Between Dilution and Infringement
The fundamental reason why parody is not actionable under
trademark law differs as between infringement and dilution claims.
This inconsistency leads to the same two problems identified re-
garding nominative fair use: there are differences in how parody is
protected in dilution and infringement cases, and there are differ-
ences in the way that courts define parody. Such inconsistency
threatens the nationwide scope of trademark protection, where the
same uses ought to be consistently held, in any court, to be either
protected parody or not, and threatens the public's ability to use
trademarks in certain ways without the consent of the markowner.
In the context of parody, the TDRA establishes a bright-line ex-
emption" that prohibits dilution claims regarding "any fair use,"
including use in "identifying and parodying, criticizing, or com-
menting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of
the famous mark owner."9 ' As long as a trademark is used as parody
by a third party, he need not fear a suit for dilution. If any suit aris-
es, the focus is on his use of the mark, and whether that is or is not
parodic, which can be resolved relatively quickly and inexpensively.
In infringement cases, the protection given to expressive uses of
trademarks, including parody, is judicially created. This is very dif-
ferent from the statutory exemption for parody in dilution cases."
89. See, e.g., id. at 493 ("We have stated the 'general proposition' that 'parody and sat-
ire are deserving of substantial freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of social and
literary criticism.'" (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publ'ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964)));
MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 900 ("[T]he trademark owner does not have the right to control
public discourse whenever the public imbues his mark with a meaning beyond its source-
identifying function."); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775-77 (8th
Cir. 1994) (holding that parody is not entitled to absolute protection while also noting that
the rights of markowners must be evaluated in light of the public interest in free expres-
sion); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 24:126.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (3) (2006) ("The following shall not be actionable as dilution
by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection . . .
91. Id. § 1125(c) (3) (A) (ii).
92. Id. § 1125(c) (3). It should be noted that the statutory protection for parody in di-
lution cases applies only if the parody is not itself being used as a trademark (i.e., that it is
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Further, as in nominative fair use, in infringement cases the doc-
trine is, at its base, not that parody is protected speech, but that, if
understood correctly, parodic speech is not likely to cause confusion."1 In
other words, the "exemption" from infringement liability is in fact
simply an inability to state a claim due to a lack of likely confusion,
rather than a true exemption for parody.94 Conversely, in dilution
cases, parody is protected because it is parody, regardless of wheth-
er it in fact causes dilution." As will be discussed below, some
circuit courts of appeal do employ a separate test for parody, but
this is understood as merely an analogue of traditional likelihood
of confusion analysis, not as an independent test.
This is inherently inconsistent with the wider protection given in
dilution cases, where a parodic use of a trademark may well dilute,
but an action is nonetheless barred. Further, as discussed in Part II
supra, the likelihood of confusion test usually requires complex
factual findings and extensive litigation-something far beyond
the means of the average individual. Again, the most substantial
problem with this inconsistency is that it undermines the reason to
protect parody: preserving the ability of third parties to use existing
trademarks to parody their owners. Partial or inconsistent protec-
tion does not, in actuality, freely permit such use, and hence
frustrates the purpose of the exemption.
B. The Commercial/Noncommercial Distinction in Infringement Is
Absent in Dilution
Another strange inconsistency between the protection given to
parody in dilution and infringement cases is that between com-
mercial and noncommercial parody.96 In dilution, there is no
being used to communicate, rather than to identify a product's origin); this is not the same
as the distinction between commercial and noncommercial use.
93. Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997)
(noting that parody is not a separate "defense" to infringement claims, but is "merely a way
of phrasing the traditional response that customers are not likely to be confused as to the
source"); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D. Neb. 1986), af'd,
836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 31:153.
94. And, in fact, there are a number of cases in which a use of a trademark that would
appear to any reasonable person to be a parody was held infringing. See, e.g., People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the
defendant infringed the plaintiffs mark by operating a parody website).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (3).
96. A noncommercial parody can be understood as one that is in an editorial context,
rather than marketed as a product. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402
(8th Cir. 1987) ("The injunction our decision upholds prohibits [the defendant's] conduct
only insofar as [he] uses Mutual's marks as logos or to market, advertise, or identify his ser-
vices or products." (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
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distinction between the two; in infringement, many circuits find
the question determinative." Hence, a commercial parody will be
protected from any dilution liability by the TDRA, but can still be
found infringing (whereas a noncommercial editorial parody
would likely be held to be non-infringing expressive usage).9 This
inconsistency undermines the very purpose of creating an exemp-
tion for speech-interests, as it creates a situation in which a specific
unlicensed parody, protected from dilution claims, is at the same
time subject to infringement claims. From the point of view of the
parodist, this is no protection at all.
The TDRA enumerates an independent exemption from dilu-
tion liability for any noncommercial use of a mark.99 Under the
canon of construction that all statutory language should be given
effect, the exemption for parody cannot apply solely to noncom-
mercial parodies, as that would be merely duplicative of the
protection already provided for all noncommercial uses. The legis-
lative history reinforces this conclusion: the previous version of the
statute did not specify a parody exception, and courts identified
some protection for parody under the previously existing exemp-
tion for noncommercial use.100 Under the TDRA, parody is an
independent exemption from liability, regardless of whether the
parody is commercial or noncommercial, as long as the parody is
not itselfbeing used as a designator of origin.10o
In infringement cases, on the other hand, commercial and non-
commercial parodies receive very distinct treatment.102 Specifically,
courts are much more willing to protect noncommercial parodies
97. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d
490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) ("At the same time, a balancing approach allows greater latitude for
works such as parodies, in which expression, and not commercial exploitation of another's
trademark, is the primary intent, and in which there is a need to evoke the original work
being parodied.").
98. Cf Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 266 (4th
Cir. 2007) ("We begin by noting that parody is not automatically a complete defense to a
claim of dilution by blurring where the defendant uses the parody as its own designation of
source, i.e., as a trademark. ).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (3) (C).
100. Id. § 1125; see also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904-07 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding parody contained in a song was protected from dilution claim as noncom-
mercial expressive use notwithstanding the fact that the song was, in fact, marketed on an
album).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (3); see also Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 266-67 (holding de-
fendant was not entitled to statutory protection because the parody was itself being used as a
mark).
102. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Grp., Inc. 886 F.2d 490,
495 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[A] balancing approach allows greater latitude for works such as paro-
dies, in which expression, and not commercial exploitation of another's trademark, is the primary
intent, and in which there is a need to evoke the original work being parodied." (emphasis
added)).
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as fair use than they are for commercial parodies.' Even so, courts
qualify the principle that "a parody contained in an obvious edito-
rial context is less likely to confuse" by noting that even
noncommercial parodies are actionable for infringement if they
are likely to confuse. 04 This creates a massive gap between the pro-
tection given to commercial parodies in infringement and dilution
cases.
In part, this is simply a result of the test for parody in infringe-
ment cases being the likelihood of confusion analysis rather than a
statutory exemption. A commercial parody that is marketed may
well confuse customers regarding the origin of the product,
whereas a noncommercial parody is unlikely to cause consumer
confusion, since it does not use the parodied mark as a source-
designator.'05 Such an explanation, however, does not justify the
distinction. A more legitimate justification might be that this dis-
tinction is simply a way of narrowing the types of "parody" to be
protected from trademark claims. That is, of course, a potentially
legitimate view. However, if that is the source of the inconsistency,
then plaintiffs should feel aggrieved, as the TDRA bars them from
bringing dilution claims against commercial parodies that are not
speech-interests otherwise deserving of an exemption from trade-
mark liability. Under this explanation, the inconsistency still is
problematic, and still requires correction.
C. In Infringement Cases, Courts Balance Free Speech Concerns Against
Confusion, but Make No Such Distinction in Dilution Cases
Another distinction between the protection given to infringe-
ment and dilution claims is that, in several circuits, when
evaluating a defense of parody in an infringement case, courts bal-
ance the likelihood of confusion against the public's interest in
103. See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha. Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1987) (enjoin-
ing the defendant "only insofar as [he] uses Mutual's marks as logos or to market, advertise,
or identify [his] services or products," especially given that the injunction "in no way in-
fringes upon the constitutional protection the First Amendment would provide were [the
defendant] to present an editorial parody in a book, magazine, or film" (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted)); Anheuser-Busch v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th
Cir. 1994).
104. Anheuser-Busch, 28 F.3d at 776.
105. See, e.g., Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1314, 1324
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[D]efendant's product [infringed plaintiffs trademark because it] is not a
sufficiently strong parody to destroy the potential for consumer confusion. Defendant's
product ... is not so outlandish as to distinguish itself from plaintiffs [product].").
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free expression. As one court explained, a parody should be en-
joined as infringing " [oinly where the public interest in avoiding
consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expres-
sion."'o' However, in dilution cases, the exemption for parody does
not require any such test.'08 This distinction will in and of itself lead
to inconsistent protection of parody between infringement and
dilution. This, as has been argued above, is deeply problematic.
This balancing test is also at odds with the well-established (albe-
it troubling) principle in infringement cases that parody is not
actionable because parodic usage is not likely to confuse consum-
ers.'" It is hard to balance the risk of confusion regarding a parody
if parody is understood as unlikely to confuse. Such balancing
embodies a concept of parodic "fair use.""o If parody is actually
protected as fair use (rather than as merely unlikely to confuse or
dilute) under both infringement and dilution law, then there is
little justification for the divergence in the scope of those exemp-
tions as they cannot be said to have separate origins.
Further, any of the above justifications for a narrower scope of
protection for parody in infringement (as compared to dilution)
rely on the assumption that the infringement test accurately
matches the policy determination of which parodies are entitled to
protection."' This assumption is necessary for these potential justi-
fications because the current test for "protected" parody in
infringement cases does not apply to many of the parodic trade-
mark uses protected against dilution. As this Note has already
contended, the fundamental purpose of protecting speech-
106. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier SA. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 261
(4th Cir. 2007) ("The finding of a successful parody only influences the way in which the
[likelihood of confusion] factors are applied."); Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494.
107. Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494 (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir.
1989)).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006); see Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d 252, 266-67 (applying
the standard for dilution).
109. See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir.
1997) (noting that parody is not a separate "defense" to infringement claims, but is "merely
a way of phrasing the traditional response that customers are not likely to be confused as to
the source").
110. That is, usage that is otherwise infringing, but is deemed not actionable because it is
a parody.
111. There are good reasons to disagree with this assumption. Many responses to the
creation of the dilution cause of action expressed the opposite view, fearing that there was
insufficient protection for parody in the context of dilution claims. See, e.g., Natalie A. Dop-
son, Note, The Federal Trademark Act and Its Effect on Parody: No Laughing Matter, 5 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 539, 570-71 (1998). Presumably, such fears led to the enactment of the TDRA.
Hence, it is much more reasonable to conclude that the TDRA reflects the scope of parodic
uses that are intended to be protected against trademark claims, and that it is infringement
law that has lagged behind.
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interests by limiting a markowner's power to enjoin is so that the
trademark can be used communicatively. This is simply not possi-
ble with any degree of confidence if the communicative use can
still create liability for infringement. Hence, if the TDRA repre-
sents the scope of parodic uses that Congress seeks to protect, the
infringement test is fatally flawed in a way that this Note's proposal
can remedy effectively.
IV. PROPOSED REFORM
This Note proposes a simple and straightforward reform: the
statutory text of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(C)(3)112 should be amended to
apply to infringement claims in addition to dilution claims."3 This
will, in one stroke, resolve the two principal issues identified in
Parts II and III, as the plain meaning of this amendment would
harmonize the protection provided for speech-interests under in-
fringement and dilution law. This reform will also to lead to
greater uniformity among the courts of appeal in their definitions
of protected speech-interests, as much of the divergence discussed
above results from different interpretations of the policy purpose
and rationale of the protections provided for speech-interests.1 14
Remedying these issues will further the purpose of the Lanham
Act: to create a uniform system of federal trademark protection,
while also vitiating the objective of protecting speech-interests by
ensuring that the uses determined to be speech-interests are pro-
tected from all types of trademark claims in all federal courts.
The strongest potential criticism of this proposal is that the dis-
tinctions that this Note objects to are intentional, and that the
broader applicability of dilution law justifies broader fair use ex-
ceptions than those provided by the law of infringement. This is a
legitimate argument, but one that is undercut by the facial similari-
ty of the nominative fair use and parody doctrines in infringement
and dilution; there is much to support the contention that
112. Section 1125(c) currently reads: "The following shall not be actionable as dilution
by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection . .. ." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (3).
113. As stated in Part I, supra, this Note does not seek to propose what the substantive
protection given to speech-interests ought to be, merely that it ought to apply equally to all
forms of federal trademark claims. However, the TDRA has the advantage of representing a
recent consensus among legislators as to the answer to that question, and so it will likely be
uncontroversial to codify that the same protection should apply in infringement claims.
114. It is remarkable to note that the original enactment of the Lanham Act was sup-
ported by a justification similar to the one offered by this Note's proposed reform-that a
statutory framework would lead to uniformity among the courts, and would ensure con-
sistent protection of trademark rights. See S. REP. No. 1333, at 1276-77 (1946).
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inconsistencies between the doctrines are unintentional."5 Such
arguments are further undermined by the manner in which the
two doctrines are inconsistent: as described above, the most sub-
stantial difference between the doctrines is not the outcome, but
the procedural manner in which the defenses are evaluated in an
infringement case (through the full likelihood of confusion analy-
sis) as opposed to a dilution case (through a simple determination
of whether the statutory exemption applies). Thus, this criticism
seems far less compelling, in that the wider applicability of the fair
use defense in dilution cases is the result of the procedural ease of
asserting the defense, rather than of any difference in the actual
substantive scope of the defenses.
Further, even if the exemptions from liability given to speech-
interests are broader under dilution law, that additional breadth is
designed to ensure that the ranges of exempt uses match, because no
showing of confusion is necessary to support a dilution claim." 6
Hence, even if the current scope of protection given to speech-
interests is intentionally divergent, this difference seems designed
in part to achieve the same result that this Note proposes: ensuring
that a given use of a trademark will be either protected or not pro-
tected consistently under both infringement and dilution law. If
this is correct, then this Note's reform is still justified, as it ensures
that the legislative intent of consistent protection would be given
actual effect. This Note's reform does not seek to expand or con-
tract the scope of protected uses, except inasmuch as that scope is
currently inconsistent across the various forms of trademark
claims, and therefore, some degree of expansion or contraction
would be necessary to harmonize the level of protection as be-
tween infringement and dilution.
Many other articles proposing reform of the Lanham Act's pro-
tection for speech look to constitutional analogies or arguments,
or focus on the level of protection given for speech,"' or address
the substantive level of protection given to a speech-interest. This
Note does neither; it simply addresses inconsistencies in the cur-
115. See supra note 46; New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302,
307-08 (9th Cir. 1992).
116. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 20, § 24:126. Professor McCarthy notes that the statu-
tory exemption for parody in dilution cases is necessary because no showing of likely
confusion is necessary; implicitly, this is important only if the goal is to attempt to duplicate
the scope of the analogous exemption provided under infringement law (defined by uses).
Id.
117. See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free
Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REv. 887 (2005);
Kelly L. Baxter, Comment, Trademark Parody: How to Balance the Lanham Act with the First
Amendment, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1179 (2004).
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rent scheme of protecting speech-interests, and suggests how
trademark law ought to recognize such protection. This issue is
separate and distinct from the question of which unlicensed uses of
a trademark ought to be permitted without any consent from or
compensation to the markowner.
If the reader accepts the premise that inconsistencies in the
scope of protection given to speech-interests by trademark law are
a problem, it is difficult to conceive of a viable criticism to this
Note's proposed reform. Inconsistencies in the scope of protection
directly threaten the purpose for which speech-interests are ex-
empted from liability: to permit certain types of unlicensed use of a
trademark. Another possible criticism is based in simple conserva-
tism, arguing that the system works well as it is, especially when
there are few reported cases in which the problem that this Note
identifies has caused actual harm. However, the absence of such
cases is misleading, as the principal harm that this problem causes
is the chilling effect discussed above: those wishing to use a trade-
mark in speech may choose not do so because of the threat of
litigation. Thus, the inconsistent protection for speech-interests
harms potential speech-users without the filing of a single case.
The real damage is that the law does not effectuate the policy goal
that it was drafted for: to permit the free use of trademarked terms
in speech. That remains true even if trademark law currently works
well-because it does not work as Congress appears to have in-
tended when drafting the exemptions for speech-interests in the
Trademark Dilution Reform Act.
This Note proposes a straight-forward statutory reform that will
create a common source for the exemptions to infringement and
dilution liability established to protect speech-interests, directly
resolving these unintended inconsistencies. There may be useful
refinements of this basic premise, or the TDRA may first be
amended to adjust the substantive scope of protection provided for
speech-interests. In either case, however, the reform advocated in
this Note is fundamental to such further steps.
Further, this Note contends that speech-interests are best pro-
tected by specialized tests (as employed by several circuits)"
instead of being treated as one possible outcome of the full multi-
factor test for infringement.'19 Again, it frustrates the basic purpose
of protecting speech-interests to make them so expensive to assert
that only those expecting to receive great commercial value from
118. See supra notes 48 (discussing the three basic tests for nominative fair use), 58 (dis-
cussing the merits of a specialized test for nominative fair use).
119. See, e.g., supra note 52 (discussing the application of the traditional test).
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using another's mark could do so. The chilling effect of a full-
blown federal lawsuit is immense. Conversely, a safe harbor for fair
use is commonly understood to be an admirable solution to issues
of protecting the public's interest in free expression, since the
markowner usually has far greater resources to litigate trademark
claims than the individual speaker.1 20 Hence, if the goal of protect-
ing speech-interests from trademark claims is to allow
communicative use of trademarked terms, that goal will be most
effectively fulfilled by having the exemptions take the form of a
statutory safe-harbor. This is precisely how the TDRA was drafted,
and it should be extended to apply to infringement claims as
well.12'
This safe harbor would be reinforced immensely by the logical
second step of enacting a statutory definition of each enumerated
exemption, such as nominative fair use and parody."' This would
make courts' analysis more uniform by providing a shared founda-
tion, and would make it easier for Congress to specify the exact
limitations of the markowner's right to exclude."' This would be a
valuable extension of the reform proposed in this Note, as it would
help remedy the problematic differences in the very definitions of
such fundamental doctrines as between different courts of appeal.
Further, such definitions would help give effect to the legislative
determination of what uses of a trademark ought to be protected
as speech-interests. This Note advocates that the correct perspec-
tive regarding speech-interests in trademark law is to first make the
policy determination of when speech-interests should be protected,
and then to create statutory exemptions that provide a means of
consistently enforcing that determination. Hence, this additional
120. As discussed in note 46, supra, these concerns were central to Congress's intent in
enacting the TDRA-to create a scheme of protecting speech-interests under which defens-
es of fair use are straightforward and inexpensive to resolve. See also William F. Patry &
Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1639,
1658 (2006) (discussing the disparity of resources and advocating for a safe harbor type
reform). A safe harbor can be established or rebutted with very simple analysis, amenable to
resolution on summaryjudgment, rather than the fact-intensive and inference-heavy analysis
required by the traditional likelihood of confusion test.
121. Simplifying the doctrines of fair use to make them easier to assert and to reduce
the risk of chilling effects is a common proposal for reform. See, e.g., William McGeveran,
Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2008). However, this Note is the first to
propose simply adopting the standard established by the TDRA.
122. This second step is not essential to the primary reform that this Note advocates, but
it would help achieve its objectives. Creating such a statutory definition, however, is in part a
policy determination of the scope of the exemption, and thus is beyond the scope of this
Note's principal argument.
123. Determining the scope of the rights given to markowners, including the exceptions
thereto, is a policy judgment that should be made by Congress. Such a policy determination
involves balancing the interests of markowners and the public interest in free expression.
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reform would be consistent with the approach advocated in this
Note.
CONCLUSION
There are good reasons to believe that the protections provided
for speech-interests have the same origin and objectives under both
infringement and dilution law. Their shared purpose is to permit
the free use of trademarked terms in discourse. However, the scope
of protection given to speech-interests is inconsistent as between in-
fringement and dilution cases, and a speech-user facing both types
of claims must assert his right to such protection in very different
ways. These inconsistencies frustrate the very purpose of the protec-
tions provided for speech-interests2 4-because they will not
eliminate the chilling threat of liability for infringement. The re-
cently enacted TDRA best embodies the current understanding of
the appropriate level of protection for speech-interests in trademark
law.2 5 The Lanham Act ought to be amended to make infringement
law conform to the TDRA's exemptions from liability for speech-
interests, so that the purpose of the statutory protection for speech-
interests can actually be fulfilled.
124. See supra note 46.
125. Even if this is not true, it does not undercut the fundamental reform advocated-it
simply changes which substantive standard should be used in the statute that creates a uni-
fied origin for the protection given to speech-interests.
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